Forgetting can be a salient source of uncertainty for subjective beliefs, confidence, and ambiguity attitudes. To investigate this, we run several experiments where people bet on propositions (facts) that they cannot recall with certainty. We use betting preferences to infer subjects' revealed beliefs and their revealed confidence in these beliefs. Forgetting is induced via interference tasks and time delays (up to one year). We observe a natural memory decay pattern where beliefs become less accurate and confidence is reduced as well. Moreover, we find a form of comparative ignorance where subjects are more ambiguity averse when they cannot recall the truth rather than never having learnt it. In a different vein, we identify an overconfidence pattern: on average, subjects overpay for bets on propositions that they believe in, but underpay for the opposite bets. We formulate a two-signal behavioral model of forgetting that generates all of these patterns. It suggests new testable hypotheses that are confirmed by our data.
JEL Classifications D81 · C91

Introduction
Forgetting is manifested in many distinct contexts and behaviors. Misidentifications in eyewitness testimonies played a role in over 70% of 358 wrongful convictions overturned by DNA evidence in the Innocence Project. 1 Military officers forget how to identify threat vehicles (Rowan 2015) , radiologists cannot recall details of processed exams even after short interruptions (Froehle and White 2014) , and occupational first aiders exhibit a severe loss of skill with less than 20 percent being able to perform CPR one year after training (McKenna and Glendon 1985) .
Besides the accuracy (or reliability) of memory, the confidence that people have in their recall is essential for their own actions and others' decisions. Memory failures are especially harmful when coupled with high confidence. For example, juries are more likely to believe witnesses who appear very confident and excuse inaccuracies in their testimony compared to witnesses who appear less confident but give accurate testimony 2 (Brewer and Burke 2002; Lindsay et al. 1981) . Various links between the accuracy and self-reported confidence of people's memories have been observed in legal and experimental contexts (see reviews in Wixted and Wells 2017; Roediger et al. 2012) .
In this paper we present new empirical evidence on the behavioral consequences of forgetting in decision making under uncertainty. We run several experiments where people bet on propositions (facts) that they cannot recall with certainty. Forgetting is induced via interference tasks and time delays of up to one year.
Our main methodological novelty is that we capture memory failures via betting preferences rather than via direct verbal queries. We hypothesize that this choicebased design should identify some forms of memory decay, over/under confidence, ambiguity attitudes, and provide additional insights on the evolution of beliefs and confidence of forgetful agents.
More formally, we elicit our subjects' monetary evaluations of binary bets. Any such bet t B = Z if B is true 0 if B is false delivers a fixed prize of Z = 11 euros if the corresponding proposition B is true and nothing otherwise. Prior to evaluating t B , each subject is instructed to memorize whether B is true or false. Assuming perfect memory, her evaluation of t B should be Z = 11 if B is true, or zero if B is false. Naturally, forgetting should decrease the value of t B below Z if B is true, but increase it above zero if B is false.
1 These numbers are reported at http://www.innocenceproject.org/dna-exonerations-in-the-united-states/ for the time period of 1989-2018. 2 In every one of the DNA exoneration cases involving eyewitness misidentification examined by Garrett (2011) , witnesses who mistakenly identified innocent defendants did so with high confidence in a court of law.
This methodology should be more suitable than verbal queries in various economic settings where incentives are monetary and forgetting can be significant. 3 Moreover, our framework allows us to define revealed beliefs as in de Finetti (1937) and Savage (1972) , and then analyze the accuracy of these beliefs.
Our findings
It is well-known that memory becomes less accurate over time. In the extensive psychological literature (see Rubin and Wenzel 1996; Brown et al. 2007 and references therein), this phenomenon is called memory decay and quantified with forgetting curves. The effect of time delays on confidence is more controversial. In particular, Shaw and McClure (1996) showed that repeated questioning increased witnesses' confidence without increasing their accuracy.
In our experiments, beliefs become less accurate over time, and subjects' level of confidence in their beliefs decreases. To elaborate, all participants in our experiment first learn a list M of true propositions. The contents of this list are novel to all participants and do not pertain to their general knowledge, skills, or previous actions. We find that for true (false) propositions B, the average monetary value of t B diminishes (increases) after interference tasks, and then diminishes (increases) further with a time delay of one year.
To analyze memory decay in more detail, we use revealed beliefs. Given any true proposition A in the list M, a subject reveals a positive belief for A if she values the ticket t A more than t ¬A . Similarly, her revealed belief is called negative if she values t ¬A more than t A , or indeterminate if she values t A and t ¬A equally. Thus we partition the entire array D of data points into three disjoint parts P, N , and I that correspond to positive, negative, and indeterminate beliefs respectively.
We observe that the proportion of positive beliefs |P| |D| decreases after interference tasks and then decreases further one year later. Conversely, negative and indeterminate beliefs became more common over time. A more intriguing finding is that negative beliefs are highly transient as if most of them are based on random spontaneous hunches rather than some more permanent convictions.
Next, we find overconfidence on the subdomain P ∪ N where revealed beliefs can be either positive or negative, but not indeterminate. On this subdomain, subjects behave as if they overestimate the average accuracy of their strict beliefs |P| |P|+|N | . On average, they overpay (underpay) for tickets t B that they find more (less) valuable than the opposite bets t ¬B . In bookmaking terms, the monetary odds that are required to bet on B are respectively too short or too long.
This pattern is roughly in line with many studies where subjects are found to overestimate their own knowledge (e.g. Fischoff et al. 1977; Keren 1991 ) ability, performance, and level of control (see Moore and Healy 2008 for an overview).
However, our design can be distinguished from this literature by the use of binary bets and two other features.
(i) The truthfulness of all relevant propositions is stated explicitly before evaluation stages rather than derived from general knowledge or intellectual efforts. Moreover, a subject's beliefs about the same proposition is elicited at several points in time. By contrast, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff (1977) and other studies of overconfidence use questions about general knowledge and do not observe how subjects' responses change over time (presumably, because general knowledge is unlikely to vary in the short run). (ii) Subjects evaluate propositions that pertain to objective facts, rather than to assessments of their own performance, ability, or actions. Thus we observe overconfidence without above-average effects studied by Camerer and Lovallo (1999) , Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) , and Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) , and others.
In a different vein, we use our data to identify a new kind of ambiguity aversion. Roughly speaking, our experiments suggest that people may be even less willing to bet when they cannot recall the truth rather than when they never have learnt it at all. We attribute this form of the Ellsberg Paradox to comparative ignorance. Fox and Tversky (1995) use this term broadly to describe ambiguity aversion driven by a "feeling of incompetence" and a contrast with more knowledgeable decision makers (see also Heath and Tversky 1991; Trautmann et al. 2008) . Our subjects may exhibit comparative ignorance because of the contrast between having forgotten the truth and knowing it in the past.
A two-signal model
Obviously, overconfidence and ambiguity aversion are inconsistent with the expected utility model and well-calibrated beliefs that are typical in game theory (e.g. Piccione and Rubinstein 1997a, b) .
To accommodate the observed behavioral patterns, we formulate a two-signal model of forgetting in Section 4. We assume that agents can receive signals of two types: a memory signal that points to the true proposition with probability α ≥ 1 2 and a noisy hunch that is objectively uninformative, but affects subjective evaluations nonetheless. We assume that the memory signal becomes less common over time. In the absence of the memory signal, subjects use their transient hunches, but become ambiguity averse. We run a simulation of the model that generates memory decay, overconfidence, and comparative ignorance. Moreover, our model suggests the following two hypotheses:
(H1) negative beliefs should be more transient than positive ones, (H2) subjects should be more confident in positive rather than negative beliefs when their memory retains statistical accuracy.
We find both patterns in the data.
There are other models (e.g. Erev et al. 1994; Costello and Watts 2014 ) that introduce noise into probabilistic assessments to generate overconfidence and related biases. However, we are not aware of any such models that accommodate ambiguity aversion together with overconfidence. Moreover, our two-signal approach can be additionally motivated by the good fit that it achieves for our aggregate data and its testable hypotheses H1 and H2 that we confirm empirically.
Other related literature
Blavatskyy (2009) studies overconfidence via evaluations of monetary bets on general knowledge questions. He also uses a different incentive compatible scheme where subjects make probabilistic rather than monetary evaluations. He finds little overconfidence regardless of ambiguity attitudes. Ericson (2011) observes a strong overconfidence about one's own future memory accuracy. Only 53% of his subjects remembered to send an email to claim a twenty-dollar payment six months after the experiment. The beliefs revealed by their previous choices imply a forecast of a 76% claim rate.
Inattention provides another explanation for the failure to respond rationally to some fees and incentives (e.g. the operating costs of mutual funds in Barber et al. 2005 and the sales tax in Chetty et al. 2009 ). In our experiment we did not have an independent measure of attention and therefore we cannot rule out the possibility of inattention explaining some of the heterogeneity in choices between subjects. Nevertheless, inattention cannot account for the key within-subject differences between treatments. In particular, inattention cannot account for the persistent pattern of decreasing accuracy and confidence in beliefs over time.
In more abstract settings, memory limitations have been used to explain dynamic inconsistency (Piccione and Rubinstein 1997b; Battigalli 1997) , inertia and impulsiveness in decisions (Hirshleifer and Welch 2002) , availability heuristics and confirmation biases (Wilson 2003; Mullainathan 2002) , sunk cost fallacy (Baliga and Ely 2011) and other patterns. In such applications, memory failures are interpreted as a separate source of uncertainty that distorts previously available information and signals.
Design
We ran two sets of experimental sessions, main sessions and follow-up sessions, at the Bocconi Experimental Laboratory for the Social Sciences (BELSS) at Bocconi University using z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher 2007) . In each type of session, upon entering the room, subjects were instructed to put on headphones and watch narrated video instructions, presented with closed captions. The precise procedures and design details can be found in the Online Appendix. We provide the basic details below.
Main sessions: Learning and partial forgetting
Our first set of (within-subjects) sessions had a total of 98 participants. At the end of the instructions, subjects were shown a list of all true propositions (facts) that they could learn and later bet on. They were told that they could consult the sheet at the end of the experiment to confirm that they were paid accurately. The experimenter and two assistants circulated in order to assure that subjects could not write down or otherwise record the facts they were presented with.
Each session consisted of several tasks conducted within subjects in two stages, Learning and Partial Forgetting.
Learning (L): Memorization and valuation tasks
Subjects were presented with a sequence of 20 pairs of pictures of generic human faces (5 people) and animals (5 animals). For each "match-up", the "winner" was assigned. The subjects were asked to memorize this assignment. Then they were presented with the sequence again and asked to recall and identify the winner in each match-up. Incorrect answers were revealed at this stage, which provided an extra opportunity of memorization. The entire task required around 7 minutes to complete.
At the valuation stage, subjects were presented with a sequence of 30 propositions B asserting the identity of the winner in 15 out of the 20 previously memorized match-ups. Each of these match-ups generated two propositions in the sequence, one true and one false. For each B, the subjects were presented with a ticket t B , which paid 11 euro if B was the real winner, 0 euro if it wasn't. The subjective valuation of the ticket was elicited via a procedure equivalent to a multiple price list BDM elicitation in which tickets were compared with a sure sum of k euros, for k = 1, 2, . . . , 11. 4 The monetary payoffs were determined by randomly selecting one of the tickets t A from the valuation task at the end of the study and executing the subjects' choice between t A and a random number R ∈ {1, . . . , 11}. The elicitation task was incentive compatible, and video instructions were pre-tested and explained to maximize subject comprehension, which was confirmed with control questions (see the Online Appendix). To minimize the influence of the memory task on the elicitation, the photos of the corresponding competitors were presented on different sides of the screen with respect to the memory task. In addition, each ticket t A and its complement were presented in an order that was different from the order of the memory task, with a spacing of at least 11 decisions between them.
Partial forgetting (PF): Interference and valuation tasks
To induce forgetting at the second stage, we used an interference task that engaged subjects in a meaningless computation task and learning another set of related propositions (see the Online Appendix). Then they completed another valuation task with a different order of match-ups. The same incentive-compatible scheme was used to determine monetary rewards.
Follow-up sessions: Complete forgetting and complete ignorance
This second set of (between-subjects) sessions were conducted one year after the first one and consisted of valuation tasks only. The two types of subjects participated and were presented with identical instructions.
Complete forgetting (CF)
The subjects who participated in the first sessions were invited again without the knowledge that they there were being invited to a similar study. With a one year delay, there was a considerable attrition rate (∼ 70 percent), but the 28 subjects who returned were remarkably similar to the subjects who did not return in terms of their behaviors in treatments L and PF (see the Online Appendix). These subjects were given the same video instructions that they had been presented with one year before and were asked to complete the valuation task for the match-ups of the previous year. The same incentive-compatible scheme was used to determine monetary rewards.
Complete ignorance (CI)
Subjects who had not participated before were separately recruited (33 subjects). The experiment was conducted exactly as in treatment CF. Subjects received identical video instructions for the valuation task, but were informed that they would have no opportunity to first learn the match-up winners.
Results
For each experimental treatment s ∈ {L, P F, CF, CI }, let D(s) Accordingly, the entire data set D(s) is partitioned into three disjoint parts
We observe several patterns that can be explained by forgetting.
Memory decay
Take any pair (A, i) ∈ D(s) for s ∈ {L, P F, CF }. During the memorization task, agent i learns that A is true. Given this information, the tickets t A and t ¬A should have values Z = 11 and zero euros respectively. However, forgetting can make agent i express V (A, i, s) < Z and V (¬A, i, s) > 0. Table 1 specifies the average willingness to bet on true propositions,
and the average willingness to bet on false propositions,
across subjects in each of the four treatments s. Table 2 summarizes the proportions of positive, negative, and indeterminate beliefs in each stage s. We find the comparisons
V T (L) > V T (P F ) > V T (CF ) and V F (L) < V F (P F )
to be statistically significant (p < .01, Wilcoxon Sign-Rank test 5 ). These inequalities are analogous to the standard memory decay pattern where the accuracy of memory diminishes over time (see Rubin and Wenzel 1996) for a review of psychological evidence). In our data, this pattern holds both for average monetary metrics and revealed belief proportions.
Note that the inequalities V F (P F ) < V F (CF ) and
|D(CF )| hold as well, but are not statistically significant.
The memory decay patterns are further illustrated at the individual level by two histograms in Figs. 1 and 2 that report the distribution of the within-subject average willingness to bet on true propositions V (A, i, s) and the average proportion of positive beliefs.
Forgetting and confidence
In addition to revealed beliefs, monetary evaluations allow us to measure subjective confidence in these beliefs. For each subject i and session s, consider sets that consist of propositions A for which agent i in session s reveals positive and negative beliefs respectively. If A ∈ P(i, s) or A ∈ N (i, s), then the proposition B = A or B = ¬A respectively is viewed as more likely than the (less likely) alternative ¬B. Of course, this comparison is purely subjective because A is objectively true and ¬A is objectively false.
For any subject i, compute her average willingness to bet on more likely propositions and less likely alternatives:
This definition requires P(i, s) ∪ N (i, s) = ∅, which holds for all i, except for two subjects in CF, and four subjects in CI. For each session s, Table 3 reports the average metrics
across all subjects i such that P(i, s) ∪ N (i, s) = ∅. We find that the inequalities V ML (L) > V ML (P F ) > V ML (CF )
( 2) are statistically significant (p < 0.01), but V LL (L) < V LL (P F ) < V LL (CF ) are not. Inequality (2) shows that forgetful subjects become less confident in their revealed beliefs over time. Thus they show a partial awareness of their memory decay. Note that the statistic V LL is essentially unchanged between L and PF and increases in CF at a statistically insignificant level. Thus our subjects can be still reluctant to bet against their beliefs even when they lose confidence in these beliefs. This reluctance can result from ambiguity aversion that we discuss in Section 3.4 below. 
Overconfidence
Even though subjects exhibit some awareness about the decay of their memory, their calibration is not perfect and exhibits some overconfidence. To show this, compute the objective expected values for bets on subjectively more likely and less likely propositions. For each i and s, let
The corresponding averages across all subjects i in session s are
Table 4 reports the discrepancies V ML (s) − R ML (s) and V LL (s) − R LL (s).
We find that the inequalities
V ML (s) > R ML (s) and V LL (s) < R ML (s)
hold in all s in a statistically significant way. This pattern is a form of overconfidence: subjects who believe that B is more likely than ¬B overestimate the average accuracy of this belief and hence, overestimate R ML (s). Indeed, people commonly overestimate their own abilities and performance (see Keren 1991 and Moore and Healy 2008 for an overview). The same pattern can apply to evaluation of memory as well. In one study with monetary incentives, Ericson (2011) observes that half of subjects forget to send an email to claim a twenty-dollar payment six months after the experiment. The same subjects initially reveal a belief that they will claim the prize with probability of around 70%. Unlike Ericson, we find biases in current rather than anticipated future memory. Moreover, we deliberately use propositions that do not mention subjects' own performance, ability, or actions. In this way, we alleviate concerns about self-evaluative emotions. Of course, it is still possible that some subjects can reinterpret tickets t B as bets that their beliefs are correct or not rather than proposition B is true or false.
Note that the inequalities V ML (s) > R ML (s) and V LL (s) < R LL (s)
cannot be explained by the standard expected utility model with well-calibrated beliefs. Instead, the overconfidence pattern in our data can emerge if risk-neutral subjects mix their memory signals with objectively irrelevant hunches. We develop such a two-signal model in Section 4 below (Fig. 3) .
Complete forgetting and comparative ignorance
In our data, overconfidence coexists with ambiguity aversion.
Note that the comparisons
) in sessions L and P F , but become insignificant in s = CF . Therefore, the complete forgetting treatment is effective in erasing previous memorization to a statistically irrelevant signal. Moreover, we observe no significant differences in the proportions of revealed beliefs (positive, negative, or indeterminate) between the two sessions CF and CI. However, there is a significant (p < .05) difference between CF and CI in the average willingness to bet across all propositionŝ
We findV (CF ) = 4.48 to be lower thanV (CI ) = 5.28. In other words, subjects behave as if they are more ambiguity averse when they have forgotten than when they never knew. We explain this pattern in terms of comparative ignorance-a broad term that Fox and Tversky (1995) use to describe ambiguity aversion driven by a "feeling of incompetence" and a contrast with more knowledgeable decision makers. Indeed, a subject's ambiguity aversion in session CF can be increased by the contrast between her total memory failure with the more informed cognitive states she had in the past sessions L and CF. This argument suggests that people can feel less competent when they forget whether B or ¬B is true rather than when they have always been ignorant of this identity.
Indeterminate beliefs and comparative ignorance
Indeterminate beliefs between A and ¬A in pairs (A, i) ∈ I(s) can result from the use of the principle of insufficient reason where two propositions A and ¬A are taken as equiprobable if there is no evidence in favor of A or ¬A. Thus the proportion |I(s)| |D(s)| can roughly approximate the prevalence of this principle in each treatment s.
Indeed, we observe indeterminate beliefs are significantly (p < 0.01) more common in the CF treatment than in L and PF sessions:
This finding is in line with Voorhoeve et al. (2012) where the principle of insufficient reason is observed to be more prevalent for less familiar events. Moreover, we hypothesize that ambiguity aversion on the domain I(s) should be stronger in the forgetting treatments s = L, P F, CF than in s = CI . To check this hypothesis, consider an individual metric
V P IR (i, s) = A:(A,i)∈I(s) V (A, i, s) |{A : (A, i) ∈ I(s)}|
and compute the average V P IR (s) across all V P IR (i, s) such that the set {A : (A, i) ∈ I(s)} is not empty. Then V P IR (CI ) = 5.42 is significantly higher than V P IR (CF ) = 4.02 or V P IR (P F ) = 4.17. The inequality V P IR (CI ) > V P IR (L) is not significant. 6 Thus the principle of insufficient reason motivates more ambiguity aversion in subjects when they forget whether B or ¬B is true rather than when they never knew the truth at all.
Consider an agent who evaluates each pair of bets t A and t ¬A based on two signals.
• A memory signal M ∈ {A, ¬A} is received with probability μ s that depends on the treatment s ∈ {L, P F, CF }. The signal M points to the true proposition A with probability α > 0.5 and to the false negation ¬A with probability 1 − α.
• A hunch (heuristic, intuition) signal H ∈ {A, ¬A} is received with probability ξ . The signal H is independent of memory and points to A and ¬A with equal probabilities 1 2 . Even though this signal is uninformative, the agent believes that H is true with probability β ∈ 1 2 , 1 where β is randomly drawn from some distribution on 1 2 , 1 for each pair {A, ¬A}.
In stages s ∈ {L, P F, CF }, the agent processes these signals into monetary evaluations V (A, s) and V (¬A, s) as follows.
(i) If both signals M and H are received, then she obtains a subjective probability π M that M is true via the Bayesian formula: Table 5 shows that this choice of parameters generates all of the above patterns: memory decay, diminishing confidence, overconfidence, and comparative ignorance. We can further use the two-signal model to generate some other testable predictions about subjective beliefs and confidence. 
Evolution of positive and negative beliefs
In the two-signal model with α > 1 2 , the proportion of beliefs that conform to the memory signal should be higher among positive beliefs than among negative beliefs. For example, for the above parameters, 48% of all negative beliefs and only 8% of positive beliefs are expressed without a memory signal. Accordingly, positive beliefs should be more likely to be preserved together with the memory signal, and negative beliefs are more likely to vary together with the random hunch.
We have enough data to track the evolution of subjective beliefs between treatments L and PF. We can also simulate this evolution with the two-signal model. Assume that if the memory signal arrives both in L and PF, then it has the same value over {A, ¬A}, but the hunch signal and its intensity β get a new random drawing in each stage. Table 6 summarizes the proportions of all nine combinations of revealed beliefs in the two time periods, both in real and simulated data (in brackets). Each cell of this table reports the percentage of observations in the overlap of the row and column sets. The last column and row of Table 6 report the aggregate percentages of positive, negative, and indeterminate beliefs in stages L and PF. 
Confidence in positive and negative beliefs
The two-signal model also suggests that negative beliefs should be more often affected by ambiguity aversion because they are more likely to be expressed without a memory signal. Moreover, it is plausible that the memory accuracy α should be higher than the average β, which is the subjective weight attached to the random hunch. Thus the average confidence should be weaker for negative beliefs than for positive beliefs as long as memory retains some statistical accuracy.
To check this hypothesis, we compute the average value V P T placed on true propositions that are correctly perceived as more likely (positive), and the average value V NF of false propositions that are incorrectly perceived as more likely (negative): Table 7 shows that the inequalities V P T (s) > V NF (s) are statistically significant in s = L and s = P F , but are insignificant in s = CF and s = CI . Our simulated data satisfies the same inequalities. 
Conclusion
Our data identifies several empirical patterns in betting preferences when memory is imperfect. Most importantly, we find that
• both the accuracy and subjective confidence in revealed beliefs decay over time,
• subjects are more ambiguity averse under complete forgetting than under complete ignorance, • subjects are overconfident in their beliefs.
We propose a stylized two-signal model of forgetting that accommodates all of these patterns by assuming that subjects combine valid memory signals with statistically irrelevant hunches. We use the model to find more testable patterns in our data.
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